Sheikh Musa Hilal

BASICS

Position: Paramount Chief of the Jalul Tribe in North Darfur

UN TRAVEL BAN AND ASSETS FREEZE

Background

At its 5423rd meeting on 25 April 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1672 (2006) in connection with the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan”, whereby, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it decided that all States shall implement the measures specified in paragraph 3 of resolution 1591 (2005) with respect to the individuals named in the table below.

All States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee for inclusion on its consolidated travel ban and assets freeze list on the basis of the criteria set out in sub-paragraph 3(c) of resolution 1591 (2005).

Set out in sub-paragraph 3 (f) and (g) of resolution 1591 (2005).

(From Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan)

Overview of charges

Paramount Chief of the Jalul Tribe in North Darfur
Report from Human Rights Watch states they have a memo dated 13 February 2004 from a local government office in North Darfur ordering “security units in the locality” to “allow the activities of the mujahideen and the volunteers under the command of the Sheikh Musa Hilal to proceed in the areas of [North Darfur] and to secure their vital needs”. On 28 September 2005, 400 Arab militia attacked the villages of Aro Sharrow (including its IDP camp), Acho, and Gozmena in West Darfur. We also believe that Musa Hilal was present during the attack on Aro Sharrow IDP camp: his son had been killed during the SLA attack on Shareia, so he was now involved in a personal blood feud. There are reasonable grounds to believe that as the Paramount Chief he had direct responsibility for these actions and is responsible for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and other atrocities.

(From the UN SC’s Consolidated Travel Ban and Assets Freeze List (PDF) last updated Aug 7, 2007)

References

38. Contrary to the popular impression that the “Janjaweed” were independent militias, only loosely allied to the Government of the Sudan, it appears that many of the militias were formally enlisted into PDF and the border intelligence guard. This is the claim of a number of prominent Arab tribal leaders.¹² The Panel also interviewed a number of soldiers captured by SLA who gave credible and detailed descriptions of how tribesmen were asked to fill out forms and issued weapons and identification cards.
39. For example, a private stationed at the Kebkabiya headquarters of the 7th Infantry Brigade (commanded by Brigadier General Jacob Hamid Isaac) described how in April 2003, Musa Hilal brought in some 3,000 men who were taken through the proper enlistment procedure (two forms) and issued arms and identification cards. Soon thereafter they were sent to nearby Misteriyah, where they were still supplied with weapons, ammunition and food rations, at least until April 2004.¹³
40. Militia recruits were paid a relatively good salary for Darfur: $79 a month for a man on foot and $117 if he had a horse or a camel. Officers could get as much as $233. The weapons were provided in training camps.¹⁴ Training of all the newly recruited forces however was minimal.¹⁵

NOTE

12 For example, Musa Hilal claims that members of this tribal militia were recruited into PDF. Human Rights Watch, “Video transcript: exclusive video interview with alleged Janjaweed leader”, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/02darfur10225.htm.

(From S/2006/65, 30 January 2006 Final report of the Panel of Experts submitted in accordance with resolution 1591 (2005))

112. Sheikh Musa Hilal, the second individual on the list, who is the leader of the Janjaweed, is reportedly living in the Sudan and continues to exercise considerable influence. Recently, he was involved in organizing the conspicuous Janjaweed participation in the military operation at Jebel Moon. While touring Darfur on the occasion of the national day on 9 July, President Omar al-Bashir reportedly left the ceremonies in El-Fasher to pay him a visit and reassure him against a possible disarmament under international pressure.
113. According to one reliable source, Sheikh Musa Hilal keeps moving freely with a number of Land Cruisers. However, his assets have yet to be frozen by the Government of the Sudan. Since only his name and functional title were provided in the resolution, the Panel obtained copies of his photograph from open sources (see annex IV). In order to facilitate his identification by the competent authorities, the photograph may be circulated to Member States.

150. In an attempt to dislodge JEM armed elements, a combined attack by the Sudanese armed forces and the Janjaweed was launched in the area of Jebel Moon (Western Darfur) on 25 July. The Sudanese armed forces are believed to have been resupplied with arms and ammunition through the Geneina airport. Musa Hilal augmented the attack with 1,000 Janjaweed regrouped from the Kebkabiya and Geneina areas. This offensive was aimed at cutting the supply routes of the rebels from neighbouring countries into Northern Darfur. On the way from Geneina towards Kulbus and Gozmino, several villages were burned. The civilian population was severely affected by this devastating attack, which was condemned on 28 July in a joint statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and the Special Representative of the Chairman of the African Union Commission in the Sudan.

(From S/2006/795, 3 October 2006, Final report of the Panel of Experts as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 1665 (2006))

Regarding Sheikh Musa Hilal (Paramount Chief of the Jalul Tribe in Northern Darfur), the Government of the Sudan maintains that he has not left the Sudan and, being a Bedouin nomadic leader, his accounts cannot be monitored. The Panel, however, has received information that this individual continues to act in a manner that impedes the peace process;

Implementation of resolution 1672 (2006) by the Government of the Sudan 147. During the Panel’s initial meetings with representatives from the Ministry of Justice of the Government of the Sudan in early 2007, the Panel was informed that resolution 1672 (2006) had not yet been implemented by the Government. The Minister of Justice explained that a committee had been established to consider aspects of the resolution’s implementation in order to avoid any conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of the Sudan, particularly the bill of rights guaranteed to Sudanese citizens.
148. In a subsequent communication to the Committee, dated 13 June 2007, the Government of the Sudan confirmed that two of the individuals designated under resolution 1672 (2006) — Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan and Musa Hilal — had not left the Sudan following the adoption of the resolution, and that their bank accounts are not being monitored. The communication stated that the former is a retired officer with an inconsiderable account in Sudanese banks and the latter is a Bedouin nomadic leader. The Government of the Sudan also reiterated that the other two of the four designated individuals are not Sudanese nationals, and the Government considers them rebels, with whereabouts unknown.

(From S/2007/584, 3 October 2007, Final report of the Panel of Experts as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 1665 (2006))