Gaffar Mohammed el-Hassan

BASICS

DOB: 24 June 1953
Position: Sudan Armed Forces Western Military Area Commander from November 2004 (approx.) – early 2006
Alternate spellings: Gaffer Mohmed Elhassan

UN TRAVEL BAN AND ASSETS FREEZE

Background

At its 5423rd meeting on 25 April 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1672 (2006) in connection with the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan”, whereby, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it decided that all States shall implement the measures specified in paragraph 3 of resolution 1591 (2005) with respect to the individuals named in the table below.

All States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee for inclusion on its consolidated travel ban and assets freeze list on the basis of the criteria set out in sub-paragraph 3(c) of resolution 1591 (2005).

Set out in sub-paragraph 3 (f) and (g) of resolution 1591 (2005).

(From Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan)

Overview of charges

The Panel of Experts report that Major-General Gaffar Mohammed el-Hassan stated to them that he had direct operational command (primarily tactical command) of all elements of the SAF in Darfur while he was in command of the Western Military Region. El-Hassan held this position as Western Military Area Commander from November 2004 (approx.) – early 2006. The Panel’s information is that el-Hassan was responsible for violations of paragraph 7 of SCR 1591 as by virtue of this position he requested (from Khartoum) and authorised (since 29 March 2005) the transfer of military equipment into Darfur without the prior approval of the 1591 Committee. El-Hassan himself admitted to the Panel of Experts that aircraft, aircraft engines and other military equipment had been brought into Darfur from other parts of Sudan between 29 March 2005 and December 2005. For example, he informed the Panel that 2 Mi-24 attack helicopters were brought unauthorised into Darfur between 18 and 21 September 2005. There are also reasonable grounds to believe that el-Hassan was directly responsible, as Western Military Area Commander, for authorising offensive military flights in the area around Abu Hamra, 23-24 July 2005, and in the Jebel moon area of Western Darfur, on 19 November 2005. Mi-24 attack helicopters ere involved in both operations and reportedly opened fire on both occasions. The Panel of Experts report that el-Hassan indicated to the Panel that he himself approved requests for air support and other sir operations in his capacity as Western Military Area Commander. (See Panel of Experts report, S/2006/65, pars 266-269.) Through such actions Major-General Gaffar Mohammed el-Hassan has breached relevant provisions of SCR 1591 and therefore meets the criteria to be designated by the Committee to be subjected to sanctions.

(From the UN SC’s Consolidated Travel Ban and Assets Freeze List (PDF) last updated Aug 7, 2007)

References

The three States of Darfur comprise the Western Military Region, one of 10 military commands in the Sudan. The headquarters of the Sudanese armed forces Western Military Region is at El-Fasher. The current Western Region Commander is Major General Gaffar Mohamed el-Hassan. The Commander formally controls two regular army divisions, the 6th Infantry Division based in El-Fasher (for Northern and Western Darfur) and the 16th Infantry Division based in Nyala (for Southern Darfur). Subordinate brigades are located in major towns in Darfur, which in turn deploy battalions in smaller towns (and so on to the company level). According to one informed source, there are some 263 garrisons within the Western Military Region.

Deployment of additional attack helicopters
114. The Panel had observed a total of three Sudanese air force Mi-24 attack helicopters in Darfur during its initial visit to Darfur in August 2005. In a subsequent interview with the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese air force, General Mohamed Abdul Gadim, and the Director of Operations of the air force, General Ibrahim El Bushra, on 6 September 2005, the Panel was informed that the two attack helicopters based in Nyala had been withdrawn to demonstrate the Government’s desire to comply with Security Council resolution 1591 (2005).
115. Subsequently, following the SLA attack on Sheria, Southern Darfur, on 19 and 20 September 2005, at least one, and perhaps two, attack helicopters were reintroduced into Darfur (reportedly redeployed from Khartoum) in violation of
paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005). On 21 September 2005, two Panel members observed a second Mi-24 attack helicopter at El-Fasher airport, Southern Darfur.
116. In the subsequent incident associated with Panel members documenting the presumed violation (Sudanese military intelligence agents attempted to forcefully seize the Panel’s cameras and detained the Panel members at the airport), the
western Region Commander of the armed forces, Major General Gaffar, indicated that the helicopter had “come from Khartoum”. Later it transpired that the Government of the Sudan had decided to unilaterally redeploy six Mi-24 “Hind” attack helicopters that it had earlier withdrawn from Darfur to demonstrate compliance with the Security Council arms embargo. At the time of the Panel’s last trip to Darfur in November, two Mi-24 helicopters were present at each of the airports in El-Fasher, Geneina and Nyala.

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Helicopter attack on 23 July 2005
266. The Panel was able to verify at least one incident involving two Sudanese Air Force Mi-24 attack helicopters in an area on the Nyala to El-Fasher road south of Shangil Tobayi in Northern Darfur State, on 23 and 24 July 2005 (see case study above). On that day a Sudanese military unit escorting a commercial convoy was ambushed, and pinned down, by rebel forces. During the initial engagement the commanding officer and two other members of the unit were killed and a number of other troops injured. Air support was called in and two Mi-24 stationed in Nyala were dispatched to the location. While the Government of the Sudan initially acknowledged that the helicopter fired on rebel positions — at the time the Government claimed the operation was defensive in nature, to help relieve the pinned-down military unit and thus did not constitute a violation of the Security Council ban on “offensive overflights”,100 at subsequent meetings the Government denied that the helicopters fired and claimed they were involved only in reconnaissance and directing ground troops.101
267. An African Union investigation however determined that at least one of the helicopters fired during the engagement. When visiting the site of the attack, Ceasefire Commission investigators identified the remains of a recently fired Russian-made 57-mm SKOG flechette-filled, air-to-ground rocket (see figure 8).102 According to the investigator, at the time the investigation was conducted, the remnants of the missile were new and fresh impact marks were visible near the rocket casing.103
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100 Interview with Major General Ismat Zain al-Din, Director of Operations, Khartoum, 5 September 2005, and with General Mohammed Abdul Gadim and General Ibrahim el-Bushara, Khartoum, 6 September 2005.
101 Interview with Major General Gaffar Muhamed el-Hassan, Commander, Western Military Region, El-Fasher, 1 November 2005, and with Major General Ismat Zain al-Din, Director of Operations, Khartoum, November 2005.
102 Those weapons were frequently used during Government operations in 2004 and early 2005 and United Nations-contracted explosive ordnance personnel have found numerous remains of SKOG rockets in Northern and Southern Darfur. Interview with explosive ordnance disposal technician, El-Fasher, 9 November 2005.
103 The determination that the rocket had been fired during the reported attack was based on the lack of weathering of the rocket casing, the fresh impact marks, and interviews with an eyewitness to the attack.

(S/2006/65 – 30 January 2006 – Final report of the Panel of Experts submitted in accordance with resolution 1591 (2005))

107. During a meeting with the Chief of the Immigration Department of the Government of the Sudan, the Panel was informed that instructions for enforcing the travel ban on the persons designated by the Security Council were to be received from the Attorney General of the Sudan and that no such instructions had been received by the Department as of that date. In the absence of any instructions, the immigration officials have not implemented resolution 1672 (2006) in respect of the four designated individuals. The Panel wished to meet the Attorney General to ascertain the latest position but because of his busy schedule he was never available for discussion. Instead, representatives from the Ministry of Justice met the Panel on 29 July and said that the matter was under examination. Ministry officials informed the Panel that under Sudanese law assets could be frozen only under orders of the competent judicial authorities and not by any other authority. Since there were no such judicial orders in respect of the designated persons, the matter will be examined in detail by the Ministry of Justice and, based on its decision, appropriate action will be taken.
108. The Panel enquired whether Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban, which envisaged the freezing of assets of designated individuals and entities, was being implemented by the Government of the Sudan and, if so, how the obstacle of judicial orders was overcome in that case. The Panel was informed that resolution 1267 (1999) was implemented by the Government of the Sudan but, since the matter pertaining to resolution 1672 (2006) involved Sudanese nationals, it required further examination.
109. Prior to their departure from the Sudan on 11 August, the Panel members did not have the opportunity to meet and have a discussion with the Attorney General and were informed by an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that no decisions had been taken by the Government regarding the implementation of resolution 1267 (1999). Although the travel ban is not applicable to the nationals of a Member State, there are contradictory reports about the nationality of some of the designated persons. In any case, financial sanctions are applicable to all individuals, including a State’s own nationals, and hence the Government of the Sudan should have implemented the resolution.
110. Since resolution 1672 (2006) provided only a few details on those persons, such as names and professional or functional titles, the Panel requested additional information from the Government of the Sudan, which has yet to be provided.
111. The Panel has learned that Major General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan, the first individual on the list, is no longer functioning as the Commander of the Western Military Region for the Sudanese armed forces in El-Fasher but is working in some other capacity for and receiving a salary from the Government of the Sudan. According to the aforesaid guidelines of the Committee, Member States have to approach the Committee for exemptions to the assets freeze pursuant to paragraph 3 (g) of resolution 1591 (2005) that have been determined by relevant States to be necessary for basic expenses or required under specified situations. The Government of the Sudan has not yet approached the Committee for exemptions to assets freeze and for the payment of professional fees to Major General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan, thereby violating the provisions of resolution 1672 (2006) and the guidelines.

(From S/2006/795, 3 October 2006, Final report of the Panel of Experts as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 1665 (2006)

Monitoring implementation of targeted financial and travel-related sanctions
The Panel of Experts has monitored the implementation of the provisions of subparagraphs 3 (d) and 3 (e) of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) concerning targeted financial and travel-related sanctions, as applied to the individuals specified
in Security Council resolution 1672 (2006). The Panel has determined that the Governments of Chad and the Sudan have failed to fully implement the aforementioned provisions of resolutions 1591 (2005) and 1672 (2006). No requests have been received to remove the names of individuals designated by the Security Council and Committee or for exemptions to the targeted sanctions.
Regarding the four individuals designated in Security Council resolution 1672
(2006):
(a) The Government of the Sudan has stated that Major-General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan (Commander of the Western Military Region for the Sudanese Air Force) has not left the Sudan and, being a retired officer with an inconsiderable account in Sudanese banks, his account is not being monitored;

Individuals designated under Security Council resolution 1672 (2006)
143. The Panel gathered information indicating that one of the individuals designated in Security Council resolution 1672 (2006), a retired Major General of the Sudanese Armed Forces and former Western Area Military Commander, spells his name as “Gaffer Mohmed Elhassan”, instead of “Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan”, as written in the resolution. His date of birth is 24 June 1953. This information was circulated by the Committee to Member States to facilitate easy identification by the competent authorities entrusted with the task of enforcing the travel ban and the freezing of assets.

148. In a subsequent communication to the Committee, dated 13 June 2007, the Government of the Sudan confirmed that two of the individuals designated under resolution 1672 (2006) — Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan and Musa Hilal — had not left the Sudan following the adoption of the resolution, and that their bank accounts are not being monitored. The communication stated that the former is a retired officer with an inconsiderable account in Sudanese banks and the latter is a Bedouin nomadic leader. The Government of the Sudan also reiterated that the other two of the four designated individuals are not Sudanese nationals, and the Government considers them rebels, with whereabouts unknown.

(From S/2007/584, 3 October 2007, Final report of the Panel of Experts as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 1665 (2006)

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